New Mexico Supreme Court deepens state split over Blakely

I just got news of another major development concerning in Blakely in the states.  Contributing to what I have called a form of judicial federalism, the New Mexico Supreme Court has added another chapter to the dynamic (and confusing) story of diverse state high court Blakely rulings.   (Interestingly, this major New Mexico Blakely ruling apparently came down last week, but I just heard about it today and it does not yet appear on either Lexis or Westlaw.)

In New Mexico v. Lopez, No. 28 483 (N.M. Oct. 14, 2005) (available here), the New Mexico Supreme Court dodged applying Blakely to the state’s sentencing system.  The Lopez court relied heavily on the controversial California Supreme Court decision in Black which found Blakely essentially inapplicable to California’s determinate sentencing scheme (Black basics here, commentary here and here).  The Lopez decision by the New Mexico Supreme Court, along with a partial dissent from Justice Chavez, makes for quite interesting reading.  Here are just a few of many notable passages from the majority opinion in Lopez:

We perceive ambiguity within Blakely and Apprendi that has contributed to inconsistent opinions from the Court of Appeals.  We believe that Booker provides a basis for believing [that our pre-Blakely decision rejecting Apprendi‘s applicability to our sentencing system] was decided correctly.  As the California Supreme Court has reasoned in Black, the United States Supreme Court cases ought not be viewed as “draw[ing] a bright line, but Booker makes clear that the concept of a discretionary sentencing decision is not limited to those decisions that involve complete, unguided, and unreviewable discretion.”…

Our Legislature did not intend to confer a right to a basic sentence but rather to limit the trial court’s discretion to punish within a range by taking into consideration a wide range of circumstances, and to provide for meaningful appellate review.  We believe our sentencing scheme reflects an appropriate legislative deference to judicial discretion in sentencing as well as respect for the jury’s role in determining guilt or innocence of crimes defined by statute. The mandatory language of Section 31-18-15(B) and writing requirement of Section 31-18-15.1(A) were intended to limit the judge’s sentencing discretion by imposing a standard of reasonableness, rather than creating a right in defendants to be sentenced to the basic sentence.  See Black, 113 P.3d at 543-44….  We believe New Mexico’s sentencing scheme, so construed, is consistent with Booker….  We conclude, as did the California Supreme Court in reviewing its state’s sentencing scheme, that New Mexico’s sentencing scheme illustrates an appropriate reliance on judicial discretion to sentence following a jury verdict, bench trial, or guilty plea.