“Defining the Victim in the Law of Homicide”

The title of this post is the title of this new book chapter now available via SSRN authored by Stefanie Bock and Stuart P. Green. Here is its abstract:

This chapter focuses on five main issues related to the question of who or what can be a “victim” of homicide.  We argue as follows:

First, that homicide law should protect all living members of the human species regardless of their individual characteristics, abilities, achievements, or social status; though we recognize that, as technology and social norms continue to develop, this anthropocentric approach of homicide offences should potentially be supplemented by specialized norms providing for the adequate protection of animals and artificially intelligent beings. 

Second, that differentiations in grading or sentencing based on the age, gender, or occupation of the victim are unwarranted.

Third, that homicide law should be limited to cases in which the victim has been born at the time the death-causing injury was inflicted and that other cases, involving fetuses that are injured by hostile third parties and then die (whether in utero or after birth) should be prosecuted, if at all, under the separate rubric of “feticide.”

Fourth, that homicide law should be concerned exclusively with the killing of “others,” as opposed to “self” and that suicide therefore should not be a criminal offence; though we concede that where there is a risk that a person is being pressured to commit suicide or is doing so in error, it may be appropriate to prosecute for assistance to, or incitement of, suicide or indirect perpetration of homicide.

Fifth, that in determining whether a victim should be regarded as “already dead” and therefore beyond the scope of homicide law, we should apply a set of criteria that is consistent with that applied in determining the beginning of life (viz, the irreversible cessation of brain stem function or the irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory function).