Supreme Court, by 6-3 vote, rules federal criminal prohibition against bribes does not extend to gratuities

In one of two rulings handed down this morning, the Supreme Court continued its recent tendency to give a federal criminal statute a limited reading through its decision in Snyder v. US, No. 23-108 (S. Ct. June 26, 2024) (available here).  Justice Kavanaugh authored the opinion for Court, which starts this way:

Section 666 of Title 18 makes it a crime for state and local officials to “corruptly” solicit, accept, or agree to accept “anything of value from any person, intending to be influenced or rewarded” for an official act. § 666(a)(1)(B).  That law prohibits state and local officials from accepting bribes that are promised or given before the official act. Those bribes are punishable by up to 10 years’ imprisonment.

The question in this case is whether § 666 also makes it a crime for state and local officials to accept gratuities—for example, gift cards, lunches, plaques, books, framed photos, or the like — that may be given as a token of appreciation after the official act.  The answer is no.  State and local governments often regulate the gifts that state and local officials may accept. Section 666 does not supplement those state and local rules by subjecting 19 million state and local officials to up to 10 years in federal prison for accepting even commonplace gratuities.  Rather, § 666 leaves it to state and local governments to regulate gratuities to state and local officials.

Justice Gorsuch authored a short concurring opinion which starts this way:

Call it what you will. The Court today speaks of inferences from the word “corruptly,” the statute’s history and structure, and associated punishments. See ante, at 7. It discusses concerns of fair notice and federalism. Ibid. But the bottom line is that, for all those reasons, any fair reader of this statute would be left with a reasonable doubt about whether it covers the defendant’s charged conduct. And when that happens, judges are bound by the ancient rule of lenity to decide the case as the Court does today, not for the prosecutor but for the presumptively free individual.

Justice Jackson authored a lengthy dissent, which was joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan.  Here are excerpts from the start of her opinion:

James Snyder, a former Indiana mayor, was convicted by a jury of violating § 666 after he steered more than $1 million in city contracts to a local truck dealership, which turned around and cut him a $13,000 check.  He asks us to decide whether the language of § 666 criminalizes both bribes and gratuities, or just bribes. And he says the answer matters because bribes require an upfront agreement to take official actions for payment, and he never agreed beforehand to be paid the $13,000 from the dealership.

Snyder’s absurd and atextual reading of the statute is one only today’s Court could love.  Ignoring the plain text of § 666 — which, again, expressly targets officials who “corruptly” solicit, accept, or agree to accept payments “intending to be influenced or rewarded” — the Court concludes that the statute does not criminalize gratuities at all.  This is so, apparently, because “[s]tate and local governments often regulate the gifts that state and local officials may accept,” ante, at 1, which, according to the majority, means that § 666 cannot.

The Court’s reasoning elevates nonexistent federalism concerns over the plain text of this statute and is a quintessential example of the tail wagging the dog.