Notable Third Circuit panel ruling finds ineffectiveness in erroneous sentencing plea advice

A helpful reader alerted me to a new panel ruling from the Third Circuit in Baker v. US, No. 23-2059 (3d Cir. July 25, 2024) (available here). The start of the extended opinion highlights why it seems to me notable:

Following a robbery of the First Atlantic Federal Credit Union in Neptune, New Jersey on January 13, 2010, federal prosecutors charged Steven Baker with bank robbery and using a firearm during the robbery, the latter in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).  They offered Baker a plea agreement, under which he would plead guilty to those two charges and also admit to, but not be charged with, the commission of two other bank robberies while using a firearm.

It was here the problems at the heart of this appeal began.  Baker’s counsel advised him that he faced a total of 1517 years’ imprisonment if he accepted the plea and that, if he did not accept it, the Government would also charge him in connection with the two other armed bank robberies.  As to the three potential Section 924(c) counts, his counsel told him that he faced a consecutive term of 21 years’ imprisonment.  In fact, he faced a consecutive 57-year mandatory minimum sentence under the statute’s “stacking” provision then in effect.  After receiving this highly inaccurate advice, Baker turned down the plea, was charged in connection with the other robberies, and proceeded to trial, where he was convicted on all counts.  His sentence was 57 years on the Section 924(c) counts plus 87 months on the bank robbery charges.

Baker filed a direct appeal, and we affirmed the judgment and sentence.  United States v. Baker, 496 F. App’x 201, 206 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1148 (2013).  He then filed a Section 2255 federal habeas motion, arguing that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective for severely miscalculating his sentence exposure as he weighed the plea offer. 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  The District Court denied relief, determining Baker could not show prejudice.

Considering the significant disparity in Baker’s comparative sentence exposure between accepting the plea offer and going to trial and crediting his testimony that he would have accepted the plea agreement but for his counsel’s error, we conclude that Baker has demonstrated prejudice.  Thus, we reverse and remand.