Fifth Circuit panel declares unconstitutional application of federal prohibition on gun possession by “unlawful user” of controlled substances

A Fifth Circuit panel today declared unconstitutional a federal gun possession prohibition as applied to a “non-violent, marijuana smoking gunowner.” The unanimous panel ruling in US v. Connelly, No. 23-50312 (5th Cir. Aug. 28, 2024) (available here), starts and ends this way:

Paola Connelly is a non-violent, marijuana smoking gunowner.  El Paso police came to her house in response to a “shots fired” call. When they arrived, they saw John, Paola’s husband, standing at their neighbor’s door firing a shotgun. After arresting him, they spoke with Paola, who indicated that she would at times smoke marijuana as a sleep aid and for anxiety. A sweep revealed that the Connellys’ home contained drug paraphernalia and several firearms, including firearms owned by Paola.  There was no indication that Paola was intoxicated at the time.

Paola was charged with violating: (1) 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) by possessing firearms and ammunition as an unlawful user of a controlled substance, and (2) 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(3) by providing firearms and ammunition to an unlawful user of a controlled substance. Paola argued in a motion to dismiss, and the District Court ultimately agreed, that §§ 922(g)(3) and 922(d)(3) were facially unconstitutional and that § 922(g)(3) was unconstitutional as applied to her under the Second Amendment.

This appeal asks us to consider whether Paola’s Second Amendment rights were infringed, and the answer depends on whether § 922(g)(3) is consistent with our history and tradition of firearms regulation.  The short of it is that our history and tradition may support some limits on a presently intoxicated person’s right to carry a weapon (and for that reason Paola’s facial challenges to §§ 922(g)(3) and 922(d)(3) fail), but they do not support disarming a sober person based solely on past substance usage.  Nor, contrary to what the government contends, do restrictions on the mentally ill or more generalized traditions of disarming “dangerous” persons apply to nonviolent, occasional drug users when of sound mind.  We AFFIRM as to Paola’s as-applied challenge and REVERSE as to her facial challenges….

Paola’s § 922(g)(3) charge is inconsistent with our history and tradition of firearms regulations for the reasons discussed above, so we AFFIRM the judgment of dismissal as to her as-applied challenge.  But that holding is narrow. There undoubtedly exist circumstances where § 922(g)(3) may apply constitutionally, such as when it bans a presently intoxicated person from carrying firearms, so we REVERSE as to Paola’s facial challenge.  Finally, we REVERSE as to Paola’s facial challenge to § 922(d)(3).