Booker oldies but goodies

One of many benefits I get from having chances to roam the country talking about Booker is that I often learn about great Booker rulings that I did not see when they were first decided.  For example, one of my co-panelists yesterday was ND Illinois Judge Matthew Kennelly, and he mentioned his interesting and thoughtful fast-track decision in US v. Medrano-Duran, 386 F. Supp. 2d 943 (N.D. Ill. Aug 11, 2005).  Here are the highlights:

[T]he Court determined that the disparity between Medrano-Duran and illegal re-entry defendants in districts with early disposition programs was an unwarranted disparity among similarly situated defendants within the meaning of § 3553(a)(6). In imposing sentence, the Court reduced Medrano-Duran’s advisory Guideline range by three offense levels, which appeared to be the average of the departures given in districts whose early disposition programs are departure-based as provided in the PROTECT Act and § 5K3.1.  That reduced Medrano-Duran’s range to forty-one to fifty-one months, a range that the Court found to be sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to meet the purposes of § 3553(a)(2).  In imposing the particular sentence, the Court considered Medrano-Duran’s personal characteristics, including his youth, the fact that he had no prior illegal re-entry offenses, and the fact that he committed no other crimes following his return to this country in 2004.

Similarly, last week when participating in Arizona State’s punishment symposium, one speaker spotlighted the interesting and thoughtful decision by Judge Curtis Collier in US v. Phelps, 366 F. Supp. 2d 580 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 01, 2005), discussing post-Booker sentencing methodolofy the weight that should be given to the guidelines. Here are the highlights:

[T]he Court [believes] the advisory Guidelines should be treated as a major and persuasive factor among the universe of considerations contemplated by § 3553(a).  This is not to say the advisory Guidelines range is per se reasonable or that sentences should fall within that range absent some exceptional or extraordinary circumstance.  To “consult” the Guidelines in this manner would result in a de facto mandatory Guidelines regime not readily distinguishable from that which the Supreme Court found violative of the Sixth Amendment in Booker.  Rather, the Court believes the Guidelines should be understood as the result of a democratic and deliberative process designed to give tangible expression to the nation’s collective penal philosophy, taking into account the assorted broad principles and ideals underlying criminal sentencing. It is not for this Court to second-guess those determinations or apply its own ideological gloss thereto; rather, the Court is charged with giving effect to those abstract policy, moral, and philosophical judgments and it best does so by faithfully and completely applying the Guidelines.  However, Congress, the Sentencing Commission, and the Guidelines are inherently limited in their ability to account for all of the relevant § 3553(a) factors in all cases.  Accordingly, the Court will treat the advisory Guidelines as controlling with respect to that of which they are capable of being and purport to be representative (i.e., society’s collective opinion as to the sort of sentence merited by a faceless defendant who has committed a particular offense under certain abstract circumstances), but will endeavor to render its own judgment as to the presence and weight of the various sentencing objectives in a particular case.