SCOTUS grants cert to address whether prisoner can seek money damages under RLUIPA

This morning’s Supreme Court orders list is quite short, but it is also sweet for one prisoner who is seeking damages from Louisiana prison official for a violation of his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act.  The cert grant in in Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections and Public Safety was from a petition setting for the question presented this way:

Congress has enacted two “sister” statutes to protect religious exercise: the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq., and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq. In Tanzin v. Tanvir, 592 U.S. 43 (2020), this Court held that an individual may sue a government official in his individual capacity for damages for violations of RFRA. RLUIPA’s relevant language is identical.

The question presented is whether an individual may sue a government official in his individual capacity for damages for violations of RLUIPA.

Over at SCOTUSblog, John Elwood a few weeks ago had this review of the case as it was looking cert-likely:

Damon Landor is a devout Rastafarian who has taken a religious vow not to cut his dreadlocks. While incarcerated, he was restrained and had his head forcibly shaved by Louisiana prison officials even after he had showed them a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit holding that cutting religious prisoners’ dreadlocks violates the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act.

After his release, Landor sued the prison officials in their individual capacities, but the district court dismissed his suit on the ground that decisions in the 5th Circuit do not allow individuals to bring lawsuits for compensatory or punitive damages under RLUIPA. The 5th Circuit affirmed that decision in Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections and Public Safety, reasoning that it had previously held that “RLUIPA was ‘enacted pursuant to Congress’s Spending Clause power,’” and that because “Spending Clause legislation ‘operates like a contract’ … ‘only the grant recipient—the state—may be liable for its violation.’” 

By a vote of 11-6 and over two dissenting opinions, the full court denied review. Judge Edith Brown Clement, joined by eight judges, concurred in the denial of rehearing, saying that “only the Supreme Court can answer” whether such damages are permissible under the spending clause.

Landor, supported by eight “friend of the court” briefs, now asks the court to settle the question: Does RLUIPA’s authorization of “appropriate relief” authorize suits for money damages against state officials in their personal capacities? Back in October, the court asked for the views of the solicitor general.  The United States recently weighed in and recommends that the court grant review.