Notable recent Third Circuit ruling on required process for sentence reduction motions under 18 USC § 3582(c)(2)

I just came across a notable ruling from a Third Circuit panel late last week in US v. Harmon, No. 24-2057 (3d Cir. Aug. 14, 2025) (available here) addressing the required process for the adjudication of sentence reduction motions under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  Here is how it starts:

Paul Harmon pled guilty in 2021 to one count of wire fraud. In 2024, he moved under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) for a sentence reduction because of a new, retroactive section of the Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1.  The District Court, relying on a victim impact statement from the initial sentencing, denied the motion on the ground that Harmon’s crimes had caused substantial financial hardship to his victims. It offered Harmon no opportunity to challenge the facts in the statement at the motion-for-sentence-reduction stage. He appeals, contending the Court’s reliance on that statement violated his due-process rights.

We hold that U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a), which outlines dueprocess protections for sentencing, applies to the consideration of motions for sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Put simply, defendants must be “given notice of and an opportunity to contest new information relied on by the district court in a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding.”  United States v. Jules, 595 F.3d 1239, 1245 (11th Cir. 2010). Applying this rule here, we affirm Harmon’s sentence because the information he seeks to contest is not new.

Among a number of notable aspects of the penal ruling is the flagging of circuit split because the Ninth Circuit held some years ago that “Section 6A1.3 applies only in original sentencing proceedings, and not in § 3582(c)(2) proceedings.”