Second Circuit finds authority to detain supervised releasee awaiting revocation hearing

A Second Circuit panel issued a notable opinion yesterday in United States v. Mercado, No. 25-206-cr (2d Cir. Aug. 26, 2025) (available here), regarding supervised release rules.  Here is how the opinion starts:

The government appeals from an amended order, entered on January 24, 2025, by the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Stefan R. Underhill, Judge), denying its motion to detain Defendant-Appellee Carlos Mercado pending revocation proceedings for an alleged violation of the terms of his supervised release. In doing so, the district court explained that under the Non-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a), Mercado, as a United States citizen, could be detained pending revocation proceedings only if his detention was authorized by statute, and it found there was no such statutory authority.  Thus, the district court concluded that it was not authorized to detain Mercado pending the adjudication of his alleged supervised release violation.

On appeal, the government contends that the district court erred in denying its detention motion because, among other reasons, the detention of a supervisee alleged to have committed a supervised release violation pending revocation proceedings is authorized by statute, namely, 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1).  Separately, in response to Mercado’s motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, the government asserts that we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal under, among other provisions, 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

As an initial matter, we conclude that we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal because an order related to detention or release, under Section 3145(c), constitutes a final order under Section 1291 that can be appealed to this Court.  We further hold that a district court has the authority to detain a supervisee charged with a supervised release violation pending revocation proceedings.  In particular, we hold that Section 3143(a)(1) authorizes such detention because a supervisee was found “guilty of an offense” when he was originally convicted and, with the initiation of revocation proceedings, is “awaiting . . . execution” of a portion of his sentence for that conviction. 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1). Therefore, because the district court erred in determining that it lacked the authority to detain Mercado pending his revocation proceedings, the district court shall determine on remand whether such detention is warranted in this case pursuant to Section 3143(a)(1) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(a)(6).