District court rejects feds motion to dismiss indictment deemed a “direct attempt to override the Court’s decision to sentence Defendant to four months in prison”
Paul Cassell writing here at The Volokh Conspirary flags an interesting new ruling in a case involving a federal criminal conviction and sentencing of a police officer for using excessive force. The post provides details about the case and Paul’s role as counsel representing the crime victim; sentencing fans will be intrigued to read about federal prosecutors’ decision to move for dismissal only after the judge imposed a four month sentence, which was harsher than the probation term prosecutors had requested. The district judge, in this extended opinion, provided reasons for denying the motion, and that opinion merits a read in full. Here are some excerpts:
The motion is a direct attempt to override the Court’s decision to sentence Defendant to four months in prison. Indeed, after the Court rejected its request for probation and imposed a custodial sentence, the Government responded by seeking to dismiss all charges — ensuring Defendant serves no time at all. Put simply, the Government disagrees with the Court’s sentencing decision and is using Rule 48(a) to erase it. It has even acknowledged that this is its reason for seeking dismissal.
Using Rule 48(a) in this way is contrary to the public interest. “[T]he government cannot circumvent the Court’s sentencing authority by waiting until after a sentence has been imposed to selectively dismiss charges with the goal of obtaining a desired result.” See Thorpe, 2023 WL 2139399 (denying a Rule 48(a) motion where the government moved to dismiss all charges after sentencing because it believed that the defendant’s sentence was “disproportionately longer” than his co-conspirator’s)…
This reasoning aligns with core separation of powers principles. “Sentencing responsibility is committed to the judicial, not executive branch of government.” United States v. Messina, 806 F.3d 55, 66 (2d Cir. 2015). When the Government uses a Rule 48(a) motion to circumvent a court’s sentence, it intrudes on the judiciary’s exclusive sentencing authority and erodes the separation of powers. And because “the doctrine of separation of powers is vital for constitutional government,” a motion that undermines it is, by definition, contrary to the public interest. Chadha v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 634 F.2d 408, 421 (9th Cir. 1980).
To be clear, the Court recognizes that separation of powers concerns “generally require a district court to defer to the government’s decision to seek a dismissal of a criminal charge.” Gonzalez, 58 F.3d at 462. But those concerns peak “when criminal charges are pending,” during which time “the discretion of Executive is at its height — and the discretion of the judiciary at its nadir.” Thorpe, 2023 WL 2139399, at *4.
But once sentencing is complete, as is the case here, the justification for deferring to prosecutorial discretion wanes. At that point, the Government has already exercised its discretion to bring charges, try the case, and advocate for a sentencing position. In other words, by the Court imposes a sentence, there is simply not much prosecutorial discretion left to exercise. “By that stage of an investigation, the Government has already expended whatever investigative and prosecutorial resources were dedicated to the case and stands to reap no benefit by walking away from a successful prosecution.” See Thorpe, 2023 WL 2139399, at *6. By contrast, “the discretion of the Judiciary is at its height at sentencing, which necessarily follows the resolution of the underlying charges.” Id. at *4 (citing Ammidown, 497 F.2d at 619). This discretion to choose and “impose a sentence” carries with it “the authority to order that sentence to be carried out, barring the exercise of the pardon power or enactment of legislation requiring a different result.” Id.