By 7-2 vote, Supreme Court holds in Esteras that federal judges cannot consider retribution factors when revoking supervised release

The Supreme Court this morning handed down a notable sentencing opinion this morning in Esteras v. United States, No. 23-7483 (S. Ct. June 20, 2025) (available here).  The vote was 7-2, and the opinion for the Court was authored by Justice Barrett and it begins this way:

A criminal sentence may include both time in prison and a term of supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a).  Supervised release comes with conditions — for instance, the defendant must refrain from committing another crime.  § 3583(d).  If the defendant violates one of these conditions, then the district court may revoke the term of supervised release and require reimprisonment. But a court may do so only “after considering” an enumerated list of sentencing factors: those “set forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7).” § 3583(e). Conspicuously missing from this list is §3553(a)(2)(A), which directs a district court to consider “the need for the sentence imposed” “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense.”  The Sixth Circuit held that a district court may consider that factor nonetheless.

We disagree.  Congress’s decision to enumerate most of the sentencing factors while omitting §3553(a)(2)(A) raises a strong inference that courts may not consider that factor when deciding whether to revoke a term of supervised release.  This inference is consistent with both the statutory structure and the role that supervised release plays in the sentencing process.  Accordingly, we vacate the judgments of the Sixth Circuit and remand for further proceedings.

Justices Sotomayor and Jackson both authored short concurring opinions. Justice Alito authored a lengthy dissent that was joined by Justice Gorsuch.  And it starts this way:

Veteran trial judges often complain that their appellate colleagues live in a world of airy abstractions and do not give enough thought to the practical effects of their holdings.  Today’s decision is likely to earn the rank of Exhibit A in the trial bench’s catalog of appellate otherworldliness.  The Court interprets the Sentencing Reform Act to mean that a federal district-court judge, when considering whether to impose or alter a term of supervised release, must engage in mind-bending exercises.  The judge must take into account “the nature and circumstances” of a defendant’s offense but is forbidden to consider “the seriousness of the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  The judge must consider what is needed to “dete[r]” violations of the law or to rehabilitate a defendant, i.e., to cause him to lead a lawabiding life, but cannot be influenced by a desire “to promote respect for the law.” Ibid.

The Sentencing Reform Act does not place district judges in such a predicament.  Neither the statutory text, the interpretive canon on which the Court relies, nor the structure of the Act supports the Court’s interpretation.