Michigan Supreme Court declares mandatory LWOP for those under 21 violates its state constitution

Late last week, a split Michigan Supreme Court ruled in People v. Taylor, No. 166428 (Mich. April 10, 2025) (available here), that “the application of a mandatory sentence of LWOP under MCL 750.316 to [two persons who committed murder when under 21]  constitutes unconstitutionally harsh and disproportionate punishment and thus ‘cruel’ punishment in violation of Const 1963, art 1, § 16.”  Here is how the lengthy opinion for the Court gets started: 

Following separate and unrelated jury trials, defendants were each convicted of first-degree murder. Defendant Andrew Czarnecki was 19 years old at the time of his offense, while defendant Montario Taylor was 20 years old at the time of his. Each defendant was sentenced to a legislatively mandated punishment of life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP). Defendants argue that the mandatory nature of their sentences violates Michigan’s prohibition against “cruel or unusual punishment,” Const 1963, art 1, § 16, and they ask us to extend our decision in People v Parks, 510 Mich 225, 268; 987 NW2d 161 (2022), where we held that, under our state Constitution, mandatory LWOP sentences are cruel or unusual when applied to 18-year-olds.

We agree with defendants and extend Parks to individuals who were 19 or 20 years old at the time of the crime for which they were convicted. Our Constitution and caselaw interpreting it requires us to evaluate the proportionality of defendants’ sentences. To do so, we use the factors laid out in People v Lorentzen, 387 Mich 167; 194 NW2d 827 (1972), and People v Bullock, 440 Mich 15; 485 NW2d 866 (1992), which incorporate evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a civilized society.  Late adolescents who are 19 or 20 years old, as a class, share with 18-year-olds the same mitigating characteristics of late-adolescent brain development.  The same considerations that were discussed at length in Parks apply equally to this class of late adolescents.  Accordingly, as applied to defendants who were 19 or 20 years old at the time of their crime, a mandatory LWOP sentence that does not allow for consideration of the mitigating factors of youth or the potential for rehabilitation is a grossly disproportionate punishment in violation of Const 1963, art 1, § 16.

The dissent, authored by Chief Justice Clement, gets started this way:

In my dissent in People v Parks, 510 Mich 225, 298-299; 987 NW2d 161 (2022) (CLEMENT, J., dissenting), I cautioned that this Court’s decision to extend Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460; 132 S Ct 2455; 183 L Ed 2d 407 (2012), beyond its constitutional bounds would not be the last step in its march. Today, the Court takes another two steps, pushing Parks past 18-year-olds to 19- and 20-year-olds. The Michigan Constitution’s prohibition on “cruel or unusual punishment” does not compel this result. Therefore, I dissent.

This local article about the ruling states that the ruling, which states expressly that it is to be applied retroactively, “will require resentencing hearings for roughly 580 prisoners convicted of murder.”