SCOTUS rules in favor of condmened Oklahoma defendant Richard Glossip based on prosecutorial misconduct

Appeals by Oklahoma death row defendant Richard Glossip has now produced two notable opinions from the US Supreme Court.  A decade ago as reported here, in a 5-4 ruling in favor of the state in Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863 (2015), the Supreme Court rejected Glossips’s claims that using midazolam in lethal injection protocols violated the Eighth Amendment.  Today, in Glossip v. Oklahoma, No. 22-7466 (S. Ct. Feb. 25, 2025) (available here), in a 5-3 ruling in favor of Richard Glossip (or maybe a 6-2 ruling or a 5-1-2 ruling), the Supreme Court reversed Glossip’s conviction and remanded for a new trial based on its conclusion that prosecutors violated its constitutional obligation to correct false testimony.  Here is the composition of the Court’s votes and opinions:

SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and KAGAN, KAVANAUGH, and JACKSON, JJ., joined, and in which BARRETT, J., joined as to Part II.  BARRETT, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ALITO, J., joined, and in which BARRETT, J., joined as to Parts IVA–1, IV–A–2, and IV–A–3.  GORSUCH, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Here is how Justice Sotomayor’s opinion for the Court gets started:

An Oklahoma jury convicted petitioner Richard Glossip of paying Justin Sneed to murder Barry Van Treese and sentenced him to death. At trial, Sneed admitted he beat Van Treese to death, but testified that Glossip had offered him thousands of dollars to do so. Glossip confessed he helped Sneed conceal his crime after the fact, but he denied any involvement in the murder.

Nearly two decades later, the State disclosed eight boxes of previously withheld documents from Glossip’s trial. These documents show that Sneed suffered from bipolar disorder, which, combined with his known drug use, could have caused impulsive outbursts of violence. They also established, the State agrees, that a jail psychiatrist prescribed Sneed lithium to treat that condition, and that the prosecution allowed Sneed falsely to testify at trial that he had never seen a psychiatrist. Faced with that evidence, Oklahoma’s attorney general confessed error. Before the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA), the State conceded that the prosecution’s failure to correct Sneed’s testimony violated Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), which held that prosecutors have a constitutional obligation to correct false testimony. The attorney general accordingly asked the court to grant Glossip a new trial.  The OCCA declined to grant relief because, it held, the State’s concession was not “based in law or fact.” 2023 OK CR 5, ¶25, 529 P.3d 218, 226.  Because the prosecution violated its obligations under Napue, we reverse the judgment below and remand the case for a new trial.

Here is the start of Justice Barrett’s separate opinion, which makes it me disincline to consider her vote entirely in favor of Glossip:

While I agree with much of the Court’s analysis, I would not order the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) to set aside Richard Glossip’s conviction.  The OCCA did not make factual findings on the most important questions, and the record is open to multiple plausible interpretations. Consistent with our ordinary practice, the Court should have corrected the OCCA’s misstatement of Napue v. Illinois and remanded this case for further proceedings. 360 U.S. 264 (1959).  Instead, the Court has drawn its own conclusions about what the record shows, thereby exceeding its role.

Here is the start of Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinion:

Richard Glossip — a convicted murderer twice sentenced to death by Oklahoma juries — challenges the denial of his fifth application for state post-conviction relief.  Although Glossip won the support of Oklahoma’s new attorney general, he failed to persuade either body with authority to grant him relief: The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) denied Glossip’s application as both procedurally deficient and nonmeritorious, and Oklahoma’s Pardon and Parole Board denied clemency.  Because this Court lacks the power to override these denials, that should have marked the end of the road for Glossip.  Instead, the Court stretches the law at every turn to rule in his favor.  At the threshold, it concocts federal jurisdiction by misreading the decision below.  On the merits, it finds a due process violation based on patently immaterial testimony about a witness’s medical condition.  And, for the remedy, it orders a new trial in violation of black-letter law on this Court’s power to review state-court judgments.  I respectfully dissent.

Very interesting and another reminder of how “death is different” in so many ways.