Notable lengthy new district court opinion rules US Sentencing Commission lacked authority to authorize sentence reduction based in part on “changes in law”
A helpful reader made sure I saw a lengthy new opinion issued today addressing the US Sentencing Commission’s sentence reduction guideline, § 1B1.13(b), and particularly its provision that a “change in the law” can sometimes provide a basis for a reduction. The full 40-page opinion in US v. Chineag, No. 01-00607 (SD Fla Feb. 6, 2025) (available for download below), is worth a full read, as Judge Rodolfo Ruiz II covers lots of ground and details the long-running legal debate over § 1B1.13(b)(6). Here is a key introductory paragraph from the first few pages of the opinion:
The Court concludes that Mr. Chineag cannot establish that he is eligible for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Neither his age nor the circumstances of his arrest are sufficient to render him eligible for relief under the Policy Statement’s plain terms. See U.S.S.G. §§ 1B1.13(b)(2), (5). And Mr. Chineag cannot rely on his unusually long sentence as a basis for relief. The Court cannot apply that provision of the Policy Statement — section 1B1.13(b)(6) — as a matter of law, because it exceeds the scope of the Commission’s delegated authority in allowing courts to consider expressly nonretroactive changes in law, like section 401(a) of the FSA, as “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for a sentence reduction. Because Mr. Chineag has failed to establish that he is eligible for a sentence reduction, the Court DENIES the Motion.
This summary sets the basic framework for the analysis that follows, as Judge Ruiz notes in various ways that Congress did not make key sentencing provisions of the First Step Act retroactive. As suggested above, I recommend the full opiinion to see the full argument, though I will here flag a paragraph from the opinion that helps highlight why I do not think the Commission acted beyond its authority:
The Court does not doubt the well-intentioned policy rationale that led the Commission to promulgate this Policy Statement. And the Court recognizes the hard work undertaken by the Commission to cabin the terms of section 1B1.13(b)(6). See Public Meeting, supra, at 4–10 (Apr. 5, 2023). A court may consider a change in law only if (1) the defendant has served at least ten years of their sentence; (2) there would be a “gross disparity” between the sentence being served and the sentence likely to be imposed after the change in law came into effect; and (3) individualized circumstances demand it. This clearly evinces a good-faith effort on the Commission’s part to narrowly tailor the class of defendants who would be eligible for a sentence reduction. But “[a]textual good policy cannot overcome clear text.” Ins. Mktg. Coal. Ltd. v. Fed Commc’ns Comm’n, 2025 WL 289152, at *8 (11th Cir. Jan. 24, 2025) (citing Util. Air. Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 325 (2014)). If a statute, like section 401(a) of the First Step Act, is clearly nonretroactive, it cannot be rendered retroactive by simply adding the label “extraordinary and compelling.”
Again, I encourage everyone to read this full opinion and its full accounting for its conclusions. But I must explain why I find the last line quoted above problematic. As I have explained in prior posts, it does not seem right to me to conclude that § 1B1.13(b)(6) in any way “render[s] retroactive” any change in law. When a statutory sentencing change is made retroactive, defendants then have an absolute legal right to benefit fully from that change regardless of any other circumstances or sentencing factors. In contrast, § 1B1.13(b)(6), does not provide any right for anyone to claim any sentencing benefit as a matter of law, it merely says — in limited circumstances on its own terms and in conjunction with the additional limit of 3553(a) factors — that a “change in the law” can be a judicial consideration for the exercise of sentence-reduction discretion (which never has to be granted and which, on a case-by-case basis, a judge can find not extraordinary or compelling).
It makes perfect sentence to me that Congress would conclude, when passing major sentencing reductions in the First Step Act, that it ought not give thousands of defendants an unlimited, complete, broad legal right to retroactive sentence reductions (which in many cases might require plenary resentencings), but still would want the expert sentencing agency to set the terms of possible case-by-case sentence reductions attentive to the significant statutory changes it had just enacted. Put another way, that the Congress did not want to deploy a kind of sentencing “meat cleaver” through retroactivity does not entail or even suggest that it wanted to preclude the US Sentencing Commission from authroizing judges to deploy a sentence reduction scalpel when justified. And, as noted in other posts, I cannot find any express text in the First Step Act or any other act of Congress seeking to hamstring the Commission on this front. Indeed, the only on-point text, 28 USC § 994(t), places only one express limit on the Commission’s work in this arena.