Notable (and failed) argument that “originalist” jury trial right must allow juries to know about sentence and nullification

Last week I came across a short federal district court opinion in US v. Valdivias, No. 20-20054-02-DDC (D. Kan. Aug. 26, 2024) (available here), rejecting some notable originalist jury claims by a drug defendant. I recommend the entire opinion, and here are excerpts:

Before trial, Defendant Hugo Chavez Valdivias filed a Motion to Inform the Jury of the Sentencing Range, to Permit Nullification Arguments, and to Exclude Pattern Criminal Jury Instruction 1.20 (Doc. 204).  First, he asks the court to instruct the jury on sentencing ranges for the charges in the Superseding Indictment.  Second, he asks the court not to instruct the jury that it must ignore possible punishment in evaluating guilt.  Third, he asks the court to permit sentence-based “nullification” arguments.

Defendant supports these three requests by invoking an “originalist understanding of the constitutional jury trial right.” Doc. 204 at 1. He first argues that our Circuit’s cases prohibiting nullification arguments are based on policy, not the Constitution’s original meaning.  This basis, he argues, requires the court to disregard the cases as “obsolete” in light of the Supreme Court applying “methods of originalism” to interpret the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 6. He next argues that Supreme Court cases frequently cited in opposition to jury nullification don’t resolve the issue before the court. Id. at 9–14. 

The government disagrees. It argues that the jury in this case has no role to play in sentencing and so it can’t consider any possible sentence. Doc. 208 at 2. What’s more, our Circuit has held there isn’t a right to sentence-based nullification arguments, id. at 4, and, the government argues, is bound by those precedents, id. at 6.

Our Circuit and the Supreme Court disagree with defendant’s position as well.  And so, following precedent, this court must disagree.

Though I am not completely versed on every aspect of originalist history and arguments regarding the jury trial right, I have read enough historical accounts or jury functioning at the Founding to believe the defendant here could make a robust originalist claim.  But, as the ruling suggests, all contemporary precedents on informing a jury about sentencing issues and nullification power are contrary to these kinds of originalist contentions.  This arena, then, serves as another example (of many) where it would seem a serious commitment to an originalist interpretation of the Constitution would provide crminal defendants more rights than they have under modern jurisprudence.