Notable new Second Circuit opinion limits grounds for granting 3582(c)(1)(A) sentence reduction

A helpful reader made sure I did not miss a notable new opinion today from a Second Circuit panel reversing a notable sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).  The 28-page ruling in US v. Fernandez, No. 22-3122 (2d Cir. June 11, 2024) (available here), gets started this way:

This appeal raises questions as to which claims and arguments a district court is permitted to consider as “extraordinary and compelling reasons” in support of a motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), commonly known as a motion for “compassionate release.” Defendant-Appellee Joe Fernandez, then imprisoned in a federal penitentiary, filed this compassionate-release motion seeking a reduction of the mandatory life sentence he was serving for his conviction of murder for hire, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958.

Patrick Darge had hired Fernandez as a “backup shooter” in a scheme to murder two Mexican drug cartel members who had come to New York City to collect payment for more than 270 kilograms of cocaine the cartel had sold to local drug trafficker Jeffrey Minaya.  While Darge (and several other codefendants implicated in the scheme) pleaded guilty to various narcotics, firearms, and murder charges and cooperated with the government, Fernandez went to trial and was convicted.

In 2021, Fernandez filed the instant motion for compassionate release in the district court arguing, in relevant part, that two “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warranted his release: (1) his potential innocence in light of the questionable credibility of Darge, the government’s key witness at trial, and (2) the significantly lower sentences imposed on Fernandez’s co-defendants.  The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Alvin K. Hellerstein, Judge) granted the motion on these grounds, reduced Fernandez’s sentence to time served, and ordered his release.

The government appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion because potential innocence is never a permissible “extraordinary and compelling reason[]” for a sentence reduction within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), and that Fernandez’s sentencing disparity is not an “extraordinary and compelling reason[]” for a sentence reduction on the facts of this case.  We agree with the government that a compassionate release motion is not the proper vehicle for litigating the issues Fernandez has raised, irrespective of whether his mandatory life sentence is unjust. We therefore reverse the judgment of the district court.

The discussion of sentencing disparity as a legal basis for possible sentence reduction is quite nuanced, and it includes a lengthy footnote starting with this sentence: “We cannot foreclose the possibility that significant sentencing disparities, even between a defendant who went to trial and a co-defendant who pleaded guilty and cooperated, might, in some unusual circumstances, warrant a finding of ‘extraordinary and compelling’ reasons to grant a sentence reduction.”   In addition, the innocence discussion is also dynamic.  But, nuances aside, this ruling would seem to greatly hinder claims of actual innocence or general co-defendant sentencing dispartity as a basis for seeking a sentece reduction.