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Interesting split Ohio Supreme Court ruling at the intersection of collateral consequences, gun rights and victims’ rights

The Ohio Supreme Court today handed down an interesting decision today in State ex rel. Suwalksi v. Peeler, No. 2021-Ohio-4061. (Oh. Nov. 18, 2021) (available here), in a case concerning collateral consequences, gun rights and victims’ rights.  Chief Justice O’Connor authored the majority opinion in the case, which starts this way:

Appellant, Roy Ewing, was convicted in Warren County of misdemeanor domestic violence for assaulting his then-wife, appellee, Jamie Suwalski.  As a result of that conviction, federal law prohibits Ewing from possessing a firearm, see 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9), unless, as relevant in this case, the domestic-violence offense is one for which Ewing “has had [his] civil rights restored” under Ohio law, 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(33)(B)(ii).  Ewing filed in the Warren County Court of Common Pleas an application under R.C. 2923.14 for relief from his federal firearms disability, and Judge Robert W. Peeler, a judge of that court, granted Ewing’s application and issued an order restoring his firearms rights.

Suwalski sought a writ of prohibition in the Twelfth District Court of Appeals, seeking to prevent Judge Peeler’s order from being effective and invoking Article I, Section 10a of the Ohio Constitution, also known as “Marsy’s Law.”  The court of appeals permitted Ewing to intervene.  The court of appeals granted the writ, holding that Judge Peeler lacked the judicial power to relieve Ewing of the federal firearms disability imposed by 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9). 2020-Ohio-3233, 155 N.E.3d 47, ¶ 24.

We agree that a writ of prohibition is warranted, but our rationale for that conclusion differs from that of the court of appeals.  Because Suwalski has established the elements necessary for a writ of prohibition, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

Justice Kennedy authored the dissent, which was joined by two other Justices and starts this way:

Article I, Section 10a of the Ohio Constitution, also known as “Marsy’s Law,” enumerates specific rights afforded to victims of crime, including the rights “to be treated with fairness and respect for the victim’s safety, dignity and privacy” and “to reasonable protection from the accused or any person acting on behalf of the accused.” Marsy’s Law permits a victim of a crime to “petition the court of appeals for the applicable district” to vindicate his or her enumerated rights.  Article I, Section 10a(B), Ohio Constitution.

Relying on Marsy’s Law, appellee, Jamie Suwalski, filed a complaint for a writ of prohibition in the Twelfth District Court of Appeals against Warren County Court of Common Pleas Judge Robert W. Peeler, asserting that he violated her rights under Marsy’s Law when he purported to relieve her ex-husband, appellant, Roy Ewing, of a federal firearms disability.  The court of appeals granted the writ. 2020-Ohio-3233, 155 N.E.3d 47, ¶ 24-25.  However, based on the plain language of the enumerated rights established in Marsy’s Law, the rights that Suwalski has asserted are not implicated in the underlying relief-from-disability matter.  Suwalski has not claimed to have been treated without fairness and respect for her safety in the matter, and Ewing is no longer an accused person.  Because she asserts no other grounds establishing a right to the relief that she seeks in prohibition, I would reverse the judgment of the Twelfth District and dismiss the action. Because the majority does not, I dissent.