Sixth Circuit panel rules so-called “exhaustion” procedural requirement for sentence-reduction motions under § 3582(c)(1)(A) to be “mandatory claim-processing rule”
A few months ago, I discussed in this post some sloppy Third Circuit panel dicta in Raia on the so-called “exhaustion” procedural requirement for sentence-reduction motions under § 3582(c)(1)(A). Among my complaints about the ruling in Raia was that the issue had not be directly brought or fully briefed before the Third Circuit in that case. But today the Sixth Circuit addressed this issue squarely in US v. Alam, No. 20-1298 (6th Cir. June 2, 2020) (available here). Here is how the opinion begins:
Like many Americans in poor health, 64-year-old Waseem Alam has legitimate fears about the health risks created by the COVID-19 pandemic. And like many inmates, he has ample reason to fear that a prison exacerbates those risks. But when Alam moved for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), he failed to invoke all of the options for obtaining relief from the prison. Alam asks us to overlook that reality by finding the requirement non-mandatory or by fashioning an exception of our own. But because this exhaustion requirement serves valuable purposes (there is no other way to ensure an orderly processing of applications for early release) and because it is mandatory (there is no exception for some compassionate-release requests over others), we must enforce it. We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Alam’s request without prejudice to filing a new one.
The panel decides (rightly in my view) that the so-called “exhaustion” procedural requirement for sentence-reduction motions is a “claim-processing rule” (and thus not jurisdictional). But the panel also decides (wrongly in my view) that no “exceptions to mandatory claim-processing rules — waiver or forfeiture — apply here.” The panel in reaching this conclusion makes some reasonable policy arguments:
Even if federal courts possessed a general power to create equitable carveouts to statutory exhaustion requirements, Alam does not show why an exception would make sense in the context of this statute. Remember that Congress made compassionate release available only to elderly prisoners and those with “extraordinary and compelling” reasons for release. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). For such prisoners, time usually will be of the essence. That would make nearly every prisoner eligible to invoke “irreparable harm” and eligible to jump the line of applications — making the process less fair, not more fair.
Appending a futility requirement does not improve things. How could we divine whether the Bureau of Prisons may wish to act on any given petition? And, in any event, why must we assume that the Bureau of Prisons’ failure to act would render the act of waiting “futile”? Speed matters, yes. But accuracy matters too. Preventing prisoners from charging straight to federal court serves important purposes. It ensures that the prison administrators can prioritize the most urgent claims. And it ensures that they can investigate the gravity of the conditions supporting compassionate release and the likelihood that the conditions will persist. These are not interests we should lightly dismiss or re-prioritize.
These policy arguments, though sound in the abstract, fail to give effect and suggest a lack of understanding for why and how Congress changed the process for compassionate release motions in the FIRST STEP Act. As I stressed in this prior post what this panel decision ignores, namely all the reasons Congress sought to now enabled district judges to consider the merits of a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A) without awaiting even full consideration of a request by prison administrators. For years, BOP failed to use its authority to seek reductions even in the most compelling of cases, and so Congress decided to district courts could and should assess sentence-reduction requests without BOP serving as any kind of gatekeeper precisely because Congress concluded BOP could and should no longer be trusted to “prioritize the most urgent claims” or to adequately “investigate the gravity of the conditions” supporting a claim.
Critically, with the FIRST STEP Act revision, Congress did not even actually require defendants to exhaust the BOP motion-request process before turning to the courts — which is what would have made sense if Congress still trusted the BOP process to some extent. Rather Congress provided that a sentence-reduction motion could be considered by courts after “the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request.” Put another way, this statute actually does have an express “carveout to statutory exhaustion requirements” in the form of the “lapse of 30 day” provision. But, so the argument might go, even though Congress did create an exception to BOP exhaustion in the form of a “30 day” lapse requirement, why should courts even consider short-circuiting that express timeline? Well, in the midst of a pandemic, a timeline intended by Congress to give a prisoner quick access to the court sensibly can and should be sped up consistent with the overall goals of § 3582(c)(1)(A). But, disappointingly, rather than give full effect to the fundamental interest of Congress in giving ailing prisoners a chance to have speedy access to the courts based on the equities of the case, this panel decision determines that it is good policy to be respectful of BOP interests that Congress itself was eager to de-prioritize.
Prior related posts: