Some choice quotes from the two opinions in Oregon v. Ice
For reasons I will explain in future posts, the Supreme Court’s work today in the Apprendi–Blakely Sixth Amendment case of Oregon v. Ice (basics here) is fascinating, surprising and ultimately disappointing. Before I get to hard-core commentary, however, it is useful to pull out the key quotes from the two opinions.
Let’s start with the majority opinion, authored by Justice Ginsburg:
The question here presented concerns a sentencing function in which the jury traditionally played no part: When a defendant has been tried and convicted of multiple offenses, each involving discrete sentencing prescriptions, does the Sixth Amendment mandate jury determination of any fact declared necessary to the imposition of consecutive, in lieu of con-current, sentences?…
[T]win considerations — historical practice and respect for state sovereignty — counsel against extending Apprendi’s rule to the imposition of sentences for discrete crimes….
[L]egislative reforms regarding the imposition of multiple sentences do not implicate the core concerns that prompted our decision in Apprendi. There is no encroachment here by the judge upon facts historically found by the jury, nor any threat to the jury’s domain as a bulwark at trial between the State and the accused….
States’ interest in the development of their penal systems, and their historic dominion in this area, also counsel against the extension of Apprendi that Ice requests….
Members of this Court have warned against “wooden, unyielding insistence on expanding the Apprendi doctrine far beyond its necessary boundaries.” Cunningham, 549 U. S., at 295 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The jury-trial right is best honored through a “principled rationale” that applies the rule of the Apprendi cases “within the central sphere of their concern.” 549 U. S., at 295. Our disposition today — upholding an Oregon statute that assigns to judges a decision that has not traditionally belonged to the jury — is faithful to that aim.
Now let’s hear from the dissent, per Justice Scalia:
The rule of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466 (2000), is clear: Any fact — other than that of a prior conviction — that increases the maximum punishment towhich a defendant may be sentenced must be admitted bythe defendant or proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury. Oregon’s sentencing scheme allows judges ratherthan juries to find the facts necessary to commit defendants to longer prison sentences, and thus directly contradicts what we held eight years ago and have reaffirmed several times since. The Court’s justification of Oregon’s scheme is a virtual copy of the dissents in those cases….
We have taken pains to reject artificial limitations upon the facts subject to the jury-trial guarantee….
The decision to impose consecutive sentences alters the single consequence most important to convicted noncapital defendants: their date of release from prison. For many defendants, the difference between consecutive and concurrent sentences is more important than a jury verdict of innocence on any single count: Two consecutive 10-year sentences are in most circumstances a more severe punishment than any number of concurrent 10-year sentences.
To support its distinction-without-a-difference, the Court puts forward the same (the very same) arguments regarding the history of sentencing that were rejected by Apprendi….
The Court’s reliance upon a distinction without a difference,and its repeated exhumation of arguments dead and buried by prior cases, seems to me the epitome of the opposite [of a “principled rationale” for applying Apprendi]. Today’s opinion muddies the waters, and gives cause to doubt whether the Court is willing to stand by Apprendi’s interpretation of the Sixth Amendment’s jury-trial guarantee.
UPDATE: On the topic of choice quotes, the post by Kent at C&C about this case has the best turn of phrase to describe the holding: “Apprendi Sprawl Frozen in Ice.”