Major safety-valve ruling from the Ninth Circuit

For some low-level federal drug offenders, the mandatory minimum safety-valve is probably the most important (and least examined) statutory story.  Today a Ninth Circuit panel issues an important ruling concerning the safety valve in US v. Mejia-Pimental, No. 05-30604 (9th Cir. Feb 26, 2007) (available here).  Here is the opening paragraph (with some cited omitted):

This case provides the occasion to explore the parameters of the statutory safety valve, which grants relief from certain mandatory minimum sentences when five criteria are met.  We have previously decided that the fifth factor, which requires a defendant to “truthfully provide[ ]” all his knowledge about the crime to the Government before sentencing, see § 3553(f)(5), is aimed at defendants “who ‘have made a good-faith effort to cooperate with the government.'”  We have never, however, defined precisely what “good faith” means in this context. We now hold that to demonstrate “good faith,” a defendant need only show what the statutory language directs: that by the time of sentencing, he has “truthfully provided to the Government all information and evidence [he] has concerning the offense or offenses.” § 3553(f)(5). In this case, the district court construed good faith too broadly in determining that Mejia-Pimental was ineligible for relief.  Because the court thus erred in its application of the safety valve and then sentenced Mejia-Pimental with reference to a mandatory minimum term, we vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing.

UPDATE:  Though the legal issue in Mejia-Pimental is interesting, I also find the case to be another remarkable example of the federal trial penalty.  The defendant in this case was indicted with four co-defendants for participating in a drug conspiracy.  As the Ninth Circuit explains, “Mejia-Pimental’s co-defendants all pled guilty and received sentences of two years or less.”  And the defendant’s uncle, “whom both parties acknowledge as the ‘true and ultimate leader’ of the drug conspiracy, was later indicted separately” and received a sentence of 30 months.

So, with the ring-leader getting 30 months and all other co-defendants getting 24 months or less, what sentence did the similarly situated Mejia-Pimental get?  156 months!   Making matters worse, Mejia-Pimental apparently tried to plead guilty, but went to trial only after the district court refused to accept his plea deal.  Wow!  Given this context, I am not surprised that the Ninth Circuit was sympathetic to Mejia-Pimental’s legal claims.

Besides proving yet again that prosecutorial charging and bargaining discretion can dramatically undermine efforts to achieve sentencing uniformity, this case has me wondering if any academics or other researchers are trying to quantify the size of the trial penalty in the federal system.  My sense is that the “sentencing price” of exercising the right to go to trial has grown even larger after Booker, but this is just a hunch based on a few anecdotal (mostly white-collar) cases.  I hope anyone working on this sort of project will let me know of their efforts.