Shouldn’t express statutory text trump perceived policy?

I have now read the interesting opinions concurring and dissenting from the Eleventh Circuit’s decision not to hear en banc a crack sentence ruling (available at this link).  Both opinions have lots of good insights, though I am troubled by Judge Black’s complete failure (like so many other appellate rulings discussed here and here) to address the parsimony provision of section 3553(a).  (Notably, Judge Barkett stresses the statutory text of 3553(a) in her contrary opinion.)

Judge Black’s opinion repeated assails what she perceives to be a “categorical rejection of congressional sentencing policy.”  But her opinion, like so many others from circuits since Booker, categorically ignores the express statutory text of 3553(a).  My sense is that even proponents of “active liberty” interpretation would urge judges to attend first to express statutory text before making judgments based on perceived policy.

Tellingly, we are already seeing blogosphere complaints here and here about the Ninth Circuit’s mandate recall yesterday that perhaps put policy concerns ahead of the letter of the law.  Will we soon see similar complaints about Judge Black’s work from the same quarters?

Also, even if after Booker it is an error for a judge to “categorically reject” the perceived congressional policy, shouldn’t such an error be considered harmless on review as long as the sentence imposed is still “not unreasonable”?