Eleventh Circuit reverses below-guideline sentence

If you like crisp sentences of six words or less, you will enjoy the end of this introduction to the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion today in US v. Crisp, No. 05-12304 (11th Cir. July 7, 2006) (available here):

As the comptroller of a corporation, Michael Crisp participated in a fraudulent scheme that bilked a bank out of nearly half a million dollars.  After being caught, he pleaded guilty to making false statements to a financial institution and helped the government prosecute a co-conspirator.  Grateful, the government moved for a substantial assistance departure.  The district court exceeded the limits of the government’s gratitude by departing to an offense level below the one that it had recommended.

The court then went even further, using its post-Booker authority to dip below the post-departure guidelines range, and sentenced Crisp to probation.  The government objected, pointing out that given the offense of conviction the law requires incarceration.  Persuaded of the legal correctness of the government’s position, although not caught up in the spirit of it, the court modified the sentence to one of incarceration, or something meant to resemble it.  The court sentenced Crisp to five hours in custody of the Marshals.  Crisp had reason to be grateful. The government did not. This is its appeal.  We reverse.

Crisp is an interesting read, and it finishes with this intriguing conclusion:

Other courts have found that a district court’s “unjustified reliance upon any one [§ 3553(a)] factor is a symptom of an unreasonable sentence.” United States v. Rattoballi, __ F.3d __, __, 2006 WL 1699460, at *8 (2d Cir. June 21, 2006); accord [more cites].  That is what happened in this case.  The district court focused single-mindedly on the goal of restitution to the detriment of all of the other sentencing factors. An unreasonable approach produced an unreasonable sentence.