The Second Circuit on reasonableness review

While other circuits have said a lot lately about reasonableness review — e.g., this month we’ve seen big rulings from the Third Circuit and Fourth Circuit and others on the topic — the Second Circuit has been notably quiet in this arena.  Through its potent and powerful Crosby decision last February, the Second Circuit did path-breaking work only weeks after the Booker ruling.  But since Crosby, the Circuit has not had a leading role in shaping the look of reasonableness review.

And yet, thanks to a reader pointing me to the unpublished opinion in  US v. Claudillo-Marquez, No. 05-4102-CR, 2006 WL 224182 (2d Cir. Jan. 30, 2006) (available here), I now see the Second Circuit recently had this interesting and important riff about reasonableness review:

Reasonableness review has two components: (1) procedural reasonableness, whereby we consider such factors as whether the district court properly (a) identified the Guidelines range supported by the facts found by the court, (b) treated the Guidelines as advisory, and (c) considered the Guidelines together with the other factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d at 114-15….

“Because ‘reasonableness’ is inherently a concept of flexible meaning,” United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d at 115, the reasonableness standard of review is necessarily “deferential,” United States v. Canova, 412 F.3d 331, 350 (2d Cir. 2005).  Although this court has recognized the possibility that a sentence within prescribed statutory limits may, nevertheless, “exceed the bounds of ‘reasonableness,'” we have emphasized that “we anticipate encountering such circumstances infrequently.” United States v. Fleming, 397 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2005).