More on death penalty volunteers from the Volunteer State

Seems like it was a banner week for death penalty volunteers.  In addition to the two cases discussed in this post, I have heard from an always helpful reader that the Tennessee Supreme Court this past Thursday issued a major ruling concerning a death penalty volunteer who changed her mind about waiving post-conviction appeals.  (Of course, as the reader reminded me, this is not why Tennessee bears the Volunteer State nickname: this “nickname originated during the War of 1812, in which the volunteer soldiers from Tennessee, serving under Gen. Andrew Jackson, displayed marked valor in the Battle of New Orleans.”)

The ruling of the Tennessee Supreme Court in Pike v. State, No. E2003-00766-SC-R11-PD (Tenn. May 12, 2005) (available here), is quite interesting and nuanced (and seems a lot sounder than the court’s work in its Blakely ruling in Gomez which is discussed here and questioned here.)  Here is the court’s description of its work in Pike:

This appeal presents two determinative issues: (1) whether post-conviction review of a death sentence should be mandatory and should proceed over the objection of a competent death-sentenced inmate; and if not, (2) whether, and under what circumstances, a competent death-sentenced inmate may revoke her waiver of post-conviction review. We conclude that post-conviction review is not mandatory and may be waived by a competent death-sentenced inmate. We also conclude that a competent death-sentenced inmate may revoke a waiver of post-conviction review so long as the revocation occurs within thirty days of the trial court’s order permitting the inmate to waive postconviction review. Our holding is limited to death-sentenced inmates who seek to revoke an initial waiver of post-conviction relief. Our holding does not apply to death-sentenced inmates who attempt to manipulate and to delay the judicial process by repeatedly seeking to waive and thereafter to reinstate post-conviction review.