Does the “Rule of Lenity” matter in answering severability questions?

Food for thought for all of those struggling — and who isn’t? — with tough severability questions and other challengeing issues in the aftermath of declaring at least portions of the federal (or state) guidelines unconstitutional:

Does the “Rule of Lenity” come into play when a federal court is deciding which of the “Croxford choices” to adopt after a conclusion of unconstitutionality? Does it come into play in other on-going debates over how to make sense of the post-Blakely world?

The Supreme Court in Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619, n. 17 (1994) described the “rule of lenity” as a doctrine which provides that an “ambiguous criminal statute is to be construed in favor of the accused.” Isn’t the Sentencing Reform Act “ambiguous” on the question of severability?

Am I crazy here? Please use the comments to tell me if so. Thanks